Bargaining and Markets
Author: Martin J Osborn
The formal theory of bargaining originated with John Nash's work in the early 1950s. This book discusses two recent developments in this theory. The first uses the tool of extensive games to construct theories of bargaining in which time is modeled explicitly. The second applies the theory of bargaining to the study of decentralized markets. Rather than surveying the field, the authors present a select number of models, each of which illustrates a key point. In addition, they give detailed proofs throughout the book.
Key Features
* Uses a small number of models, rather than a survey of the field, to illustrate key points
* Detailed proofs are given as explanations for the models
* Text has been class-tested in a semester-long graduate course
See also: Project Management or Crosstalk
Industry, State, and Society in Stalin's Russia, 1926-1934
Author: David R Shearer
In his reexamination of the origins of the Stalinist state during the formative period of rapid industrialization in the late 1920s and early 1930s, David R. Shearer argues that a centralized state-controlled economic system was the consciously conceived political creation of Stalinist leaders rather than the inevitable by-product of socialist industrialization. Focusing on the different economic and bureaucratic cultures within the industrial system, Shearer reconstructs the debate in 1928 and 1929 over administrative, financial, and commercial reform. He uses information from recently opened archives to show that attempts by the state's trading organizations to create a commercial economy enjoyed wide support, offering a model that combined planning and rapid industrialization with social democracy and economic prosperity. In an effort to crush the syndicate movement and establish tight political control over the economy, Stalinist leaders intervened with a program of radical reforms. Shearer demonstrates that many professional engineers, planners, and industrial administrators actively supported the creation of a powerful industrial state unhampered by domestic social and economic constraints. The paradoxical result, Shearer shows, was a loss of control. The overly centralized system that emerged during the first five-year plan was rendered incoherent by periodic economic crises and the continuing influence of partially suppressed social and market forces.
Table of Contents:
Acknowledgments | ||
Abbreviations | ||
Introduction: Stalinism and the Industrial State | 1 | |
I | The State(s) of the Economy in the Late 1920s | |
1 | Unruly Bureaucracies, Fragmented Markets | 25 |
2 | Wheeling and Dealing in Soviet Industry | 53 |
3 | Rabkrin and the Militarized Campaign Economy | 76 |
II | The Struggle for a New State, 1928-1930 | |
4 | What Kind of State? | 111 |
5 | The Politics of Modernization | 134 |
III | Working in the Madhouse, 1930-1934 | |
6 | Daily Work in the Apparat | 167 |
7 | Purge and Patronage | 187 |
8 | The Pathologies of Modernization | 204 |
Conclusions: Socialism, Dictatorship Despotism in Stalin's Russia | 232 | |
Glossary | 243 | |
Bibliography | 247 | |
Index | 259 |
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